English
Adjective
simplest
- superlative of simple
Simplicity is the property, condition, or quality
of being simple or un-combined. It often denotes
beauty, purity or clarity. Simple
things are usually easier to explain and understand than
complicated ones. Simplicity can mean freedom from hardship, effort
or confusion. It may also refer to a
simple
living lifestyle.
According to
Occam's
razor, all other things being equal, the simplest theory is the
most likely to be true — hence the importance of the
concept of simplicity in
epistemology. According to
Thomas
Aquinas, God is
infinitely
simple.
Members of the
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) practice the
Testimony
of Simplicity, which is the simplifying of one's life in order
to focus on things that are most important and disregard or avoid
things that are least important.
In MCS
cognition
theory, simplicity is the property of a domain which requires
very little information to be exhaustively described. The opposite
of simplicity is
complexity.
Simplicity in the philosophy of science
Simplicity is a meta-scientific criterion by
which to evaluate competing theories. See also
Occam's
Razor and references. The similar concept of
Parsimony is also
used in philosophy of science, that is the explanation of a
phenomenon which is the least involved is held to have superior
value to a more involved one.
Simplicity in the philosophy
The definition provided by
stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy is that "Other things being equal
simpler theories are better."
There is a widespread philosophical presumption
that simplicity is a theoretical virtue. This presumption that
simpler theories are preferable appears in many guises. Often it
remains implicit; sometimes it is invoked as a primitive,
self-evident proposition; other times it is elevated to the status
of a ‘Principle’ and labeled as such (for example, the ‘Principle
of Parsimony’). However, it is perhaps best known by the name
‘Occam's (or Ockham's) Razor.’ Simplicity principles have been
proposed in various forms by theologians, philosophers, and
scientists, from ancient through medieval to modern times. Thus
Aristotle writes in his Posterior Analytics,
- We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the
demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or
hypotheses.[Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, transl. McKeon, [1963,
p. 150].]
Moving to the medieval period, Aquinas
writes
- If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is
superfluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that
nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices (Aquinas
1945, p. 129).
Kant — in the Critique of Pure Reason — supports
the maxim that “rudiments or principles must not be unnecessarily
multiplied (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda)” and
argues that this is a regulative idea of pure reason which
underlies scientists' theorizing about nature (Kant 1950, pp.
538-9). Both Galileo and Newton accepted versions of Occam's Razor.
Indeed Newton includes a principle of parsimony as one of his three
‘Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy’ at the beginning of Book III of
Principia Mathematica.
- Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than
such as are both true and sufficient to explain their
appearances.
Newton goes on to remark that “Nature is pleased
with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes”
(Newton 1972, p. 398). Galileo, in the course of making a detailed
comparison of the Ptolemaic and Copernican models of the solar
system, maintains that “Nature does not multiply things
unnecessarily; that she makes use of the easiest and simplest means
for producing her effects; that she does nothing in vain, and the
like” (Galileo 1962, p. 397). Nor are scientific advocates of
simplicity principles restricted to the ranks of physicists and
astronomers. Here is the chemist Lavoisier writing in the late 18th
Century
- If all of chemistry can be explained in a satisfactory manner
without the help of phlogiston, that is enough to render it
infinitely likely that the principle does not exist, that it is a
hypothetical substance, a gratuitous supposition. It is, after all,
a principle of logic not to multiply entities unnecessarily
(Lavoisier 1862, pp. 623-4).
Compare this to the following passage from
Einstein, writing 150 years later.
- The grand aim of all science…is to cover the greatest possible
number of empirical facts by logical deductions from the smallest
possible number of hypotheses or axioms (Einstein, quoted in Nash
1963, p. 173).
Editors of a recent volume on simplicity sent out
surveys to 25 recent Nobel laureates in economics. Almost all
replied that simplicity played a role in their research, and that
simplicity is a desirable feature of economic theories (Zellner et
al. 2001, p.2).
Within philosophy, Occam's Razor (OR) is often
wielded against metaphysical theories which involve allegedly
superfluous ontological apparatus. Thus materialists about the mind
may use OR against dualism, on the grounds that dualism postulates
an extra ontological category for mental phenomena. Similarly,
nominalists about abstract objects may use OR against their
platonist opponents, taking them to task for committing to an
uncountably vast realm of abstract mathematical entities. The aim
of appeals to simplicity in such contexts seem to be more about
shifting the burden of proof, and less about refuting the less
simple theory outright.
The philosophical issues surrounding the notion
of simplicity are numerous and somewhat tangled. The topic has been
studied in piecemeal fashion by scientists, philosophers, and
statisticians. The apparent familiarity of the notion of simplicity
means that it is often left unanalyzed, while its vagueness and
multiplicity of meanings contributes to the challenge of pinning
the notion down precisely. [Compare Poincaré’s remark that
“simplicity is a vague notion” and “everyone calls simple what he
finds easy to understand, according to his habits.” (quoted in
Gauch [2003, p. 275]).] A distinction is often made between two
fundamentally distinct senses of simplicity: syntactic simplicity
(roughly, the number and complexity of hypotheses), and ontological
simplicity (roughly, the number and complexity of things
postulated). [N.B. some philosophers use the term ‘semantic
simplicity’ for this second category, e.g. Sober [2001, p. 14].]
These two facets of simplicity are often referred to as elegance
and parsimony respectively. For the purposes of the present
overview we shall follow this usage and reserve ‘parsimony’
specifically for simplicity in the ontological sense. However, the
terms ‘parsimony’ and ‘simplicity’ are used virtually
interchangeably in much of the philosophical literature.
Philosophical interest in these two notions of
simplicity may be organized around answers to three basic
questions; (i) How is simplicity to be defined? [Definition] (ii)
What is the role of simplicity principles in different areas of
inquiry? [Usage] (iii) Is there a rational justification for such
simplicity principles? [Justification]
Answering the definitional question, (i), is more
straightforward for parsimony than for elegance. Conversely, more
progress on the issue, (iii), of rational justification has been
made for elegance than for parsimony. The above questions can be
raised for simplicity principles both within philosophy itself and
in application to other areas of theorizing, especially empirical
science.
With respect to question (ii), there is an
important distinction to be made between two sorts of simplicity
principle. Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic
principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T*, then it is
rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T*. Or
it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler
than T* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for
scientific purposes. These two conceptions of Occam's Razor require
different sorts of justification in answer to question (iii).
In analyzing simplicity, it can be difficult to
keep its two facets — elegance and parsimony — apart. Principles
such as Occam's Razor are frequently stated in a way which is
ambiguous between the two notions, for example, “Don't multiply
postulations beyond necessity.” Here it is unclear whether
‘postulation’ refers to the entities being postulated, or the
hypotheses which are doing the postulating, or both. The first
reading corresponds to parsimony, the second to elegance. Examples
of both sorts of simplicity principle can be found in the
quotations given earlier in this section.
While these two facets of simplicity are
frequently conflated, it is important to treat them as distinct.
One reason for doing so is that considerations of parsimony and of
elegance typically pull in different directions. Postulating extra
entities may allow a theory to be formulated more simply, while
reducing the ontology of a theory may only be possible at the price
of making it syntactically more complex. For example the
postulation of Neptune, at the time not directly observable,
allowed the perturbations in the orbits of other observed planets
to be explained without complicating the laws of celestial
mechanics. There is typically a trade-off between ontology and
ideology — to use the terminology favored by Quine — in which
contraction in one domain requires expansion in the other. This
points to another way of characterizing the elegance/parsimony
distinction, in terms of simplicity of theory versus simplicity of
world respectively.[4] Sober [2001] argues that both these facets
of simplicity can be interpreted in terms of minimization. In the
(atypical) case of theoretically idle entities, both forms of
minimization pull in the same direction; postulating the existence
of such entities makes both our theories (of the world) and the
world (as represented by our theories) less simple than they might
be.
References
- Craig, E. Ed. (1998) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
London, Routledge. simplicity (in Scientific Theory) p.780-783
- Dancy, J. and Ernest Sosa, Ed.(1999) A Companion to
Epistemology. Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers Inc.
simplicity p. 477-479.
- Dowe, D. L.,
S. Gardner & G. Oppy (2007), "Bayes
not Bust! Why Simplicity is no Problem for Bayesians", Brit. J. Phil. Sci., Vol. 58,
Dec. 2007, 46pp. [Among other things, this paper compares MML
with AIC.]
- Edwards, P., Ed. (1967). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New
York, The Macmillan Company. simplicity p.445-448.
- Kim, J. a. E. S., Ed.(2000). A Companion to Metaphysics.
Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. simplicity, parsimony p.461-462.
- Newton-Smith,
W. H., Ed. (2001). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science.
Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers Ltd. simplicity
p.433-441.
- Sarkar, S. Ed. (2002). The Philosophy of Science--An
Encyclopedia. London, Routledge. simplicity
- Wilson, R. A. a. K., Frank C., (1999). The MIT Encyclopedia of
the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
parsimony and simplicity p.627-629.
simplest in German: Einfachheit
simplest in French: Simplicité
simplest in Polish: Prostota
simplest in Simple English: Simple
simplest in Ukrainian:
Простота